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THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS RACE: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
J. David Singer* 
THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How THE U.S. & RussIA RuN THE 
ARMS RACE. By Alva Myrdal. New York: Pantheon. 1976. Pp. 
448. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $5.95. 
In this essay on Alva Myrdal's provocative analysis of post-
World War II "disarmament" negotiations, I would like to de-
velop three major theses. First, that arms reduction is the number 
one problem facing the world community in the relevant future. 
Second, that a highly complex and symbiotic relationship be-
tween and within the Soviet and American societies has stood in 
the way of any solution for the past three decades. And, third, 
such a solution is ·dependent on a combination of intellectual 
discipline and political courage of a kind that remains in short 
supply. While these three assertions are all stimulated by The 
Game of Disarmament, and the author would no doubt agree with 
each of them in principle, it is fair to expect some interesting and 
perhaps important divergences in detail. In any event, let me 
arrange my review around these theses in the order suggested. 
THE PRIMACY OF DISARMAMENT 
While it is embarrassing to admit, a great many social scien-
tists (not to mention practitioners) have taken the position that 
the reduction or elimination of national armaments is not a prob-
lem to be addressed directly, but is rather symptomatic of a more 
fundamental problem, and will thus be solved only when the 
underlying one is solved. The first difficulty with this diagnosis 
is disagreement as to the identity of the underlying problem. 
Among the traditional political scientists, historians, and 
lawyers who have studied and/or practiced in the international 
security field during this century, excess defense spending is often 
seen as symptomatic of incompatible interests, inter-nation ten-
sion, and the concomitant sense of military insecurity. That is, 
nations arm largely when there is an objective threat to their 
territorial security and other vital interests; they maintain and 
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raise their levels of armament in response to the continuation or 
escalation of the threat. From this, it follows that national gov-
ernments will slow down and reverse their preparedness programs 
when the threat diminishes and tensions are reduced. And the 
corollary, of course, is that they will not, and dare not, make such 
a decision until the threat has been reduced or eliminated. 
Even the most casual observer of international politics will 
think of those arms races-including most dramatically that in-
volving the USSR and the US over the past three decades-in 
which each side's putatively defensive preparations constitute 
the threat that generates the other side's need to pile up even 
greater levels of hardware. To develop this point a bit further, 
there is the familiar "ratchet effect" noted by Russett and others: 
as more resources go to certain groups and sectors of a society, 
these groups become more powerful. And that power is, almost 
inevitably, used to claim more of the same, with the result that 
the pro-armament forces gradually become stronger domesti-
cally, and their opponents become weaker. Of course, this occurs 
not only in terms of material and political strength, but also in 
symbolic and psychological terms. 
All too often, it takes some economic or political.or military 
trauma to break this vicious cycle. Yet the conventional wisdom 
would have us believe that' the threat can be reduced or elimi-
nated via diplomatic negotiation, and that political elites will 
then respond with major reductions in military preparedness. We 
are, it seems, asked to believe that those who benefit materially 
and psychically from high levels of military preparedness will 
work energetically and imaginatively for arrangements that will 
reduce or eliminate those benefits. 
I will return to Myrdal's treatment of the arms-tension di-
lemma in a moment, but before doing so let us examine a second 
version of the notion that weapons are merely symptomatic of 
some deeper problem, which, when solved, will lead readily to 
disarmament. This is the equally naive proposition that have-not 
nations arm for war in order to redress economic grievances, and 
that if the wealthier nations would make markets and resources 
and capital and technology available to them, they could reduce 
poverty and deprivation in their countries and would thus no 
longer have the incentive to militarize. From this, it follows that 
arms races and wars could be eliminated via massive economic 
aid and wide-scale social reform. Like the political-settlement-
first scenario, the prosperity-first scenario has some serious flaws. 
One of them is that while the poorer nations have about the same 
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frequency of civil wars as do the industrially advanced ones, they 
experience a much lower frequency of arms races and interna-
tional wars than do the richer nations. In a number of analyses 
by the Correlates of War Project at Michigan, we have found a 
very strong historical association between wealth and war prone-
ness, suggesting that it is not poverty or exploitation that leads 
to exacerbated international conflict. Thus, the elimination of 
these social ills is well worth addressing on other grounds, but as 
a solution to the arms race and/or war problem, it is probably 
irrelevant. 
Equally important to the primacy argument is the other side 
of the coin: the poor prospects for economic development as long 
as the nations continue to pour their resources into military pre-
paredness. It is not only the problem of material resources that 
might otherwise go to more socially essential sectors, but also the 
psychological mobilization that normally accompanies financial 
and material mobilization. In order to justify military expendi-
tures, governments need to describe the adversary of the moment 
in menacing terms and appeal in general to the chauvinistic ten-
dencies that are inculcated in every population from childhood to 
the grave. An important, if indirect, result of all this propaganda 
and socialization is the public's ability not only to view other 
peoples with a mix of superiority and fear, but also with an amaz-
ing indifference. Be it the Jews in Nazi Germany or the Vietnam-
ese boat people or the Indian villagers starving to death, most of 
us can turn our backs all too comfortably. And if we are not 
moved to action by such immediate and human crises, how likely 
are we to respond to appeals for economic sacrifice on behalf of 
long-range development for a vague melange of poor people of 
different color, half a world away? To the extent that nations 
are mobilized, materially and psychologically, for war (and, of 
course, deterrence!), the likelihood of closing the rich-poor gap 
is that much reduced. 
Thus, both the author of The Game of Disarmament and this 
reviewer concur on the primacy of disarmament in both senses of 
the word. First, that neither political settlement nor significant 
economic development can be expected without a major reversal 
in military preparedness and arms expenditure. And, second, the 
corollary that such progress in arms reduction cannot be post-
poned while we wait for either political settlements or the eradi-
cation of global poverty. 
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THE SOVIET-AMERICAN MATRIX 
These conclusions-or premises, if the argument seems less 
than compelling-lead to my second major theme, as well as to 
the most controversial parts of The Game of Disarmament. This 
is that the general problem of direct _arms reduction, in the ab-
sence of major tension reduction via political settlement or eco-
nomic development, is further complicated in the specific case of 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 
A number of reviewers have already focussed on Myrdal's 
interpretation of the superpowers' behavior and interaction as 
fundamentally flawed. Thus, let me try to summarize her posi-
tion and then offer an interpretation that is only slightly differ-
ent. As her title suggests, and as she asserts in a straightforward 
manner, the USSR and the USA (with the acquiescence, if not 
collusion, of their respective European allies) have been and still 
are engaged in a complex and continuing game of deception and 
duplicity. In her view, their decision makers and negotiators go 
through the motions of serious bargaining in the alleged pursuit 
of the agreements to slow down, cap, and reverse the arms race. 
But she concludes that there is no realistic commitment to those 
objectives, and that both the negotiation process and the occa-
sional agreements on arms control serve as smokescreens, behind 
which each government is free to develop, test, produce, deploy, 
and even export, weapons of ever-increasing sophistication and/or 
lethality. What perhaps antagonizes her Western critics most of 
all (I have not yet seen any Soviet reviews) is her willingness to 
lay as much of the blame at the American doorstep as she does 
at the Soviet doorstep. Not only does Myrdal see Washington and 
Moscow as equally culpable, but she then makes it clear that one 
can hardly expect any better from the USSR, whereas the United 
States should (and could) set a more wholesome and constructive 
example. 
As I see it, her critics and all those observers everywhere who 
try to allocate the blame for failure in arms reduction are all 
missing the point. Virtually all governments, and especially those 
of major powers, operate under severe constraints. First of all, 
there is no regime on the face of the earth that is not in the game 
of interest aggregation. No matter how culturally uniform a na-
tion may be, nor how equal its distribution of wealth, there will 
be conflicting interests. The "national interest" is a convenient 
fiction for the political elite, but it inevitably turns out to be 
essentially identical to the parochial interests of those groups, 
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strata, and regions that constitute the governing coalition. Even 
within the governing coalition, the convergence of foreign pol-
icy/national security interests is far from high; rather, we typi-
cally find that these dominant groups have (or more precisely, 
perceive that they have) some interests that are identical, some 
that are different but compatible, and some that need to be rec-
onciled. And the major role of political parties and governments 
is to put together coalitions of interest groups in such a way as to 
achieve and then maintain power to govern. 
If this interpretation of domestic politics is correct, it follows 
that a good deal of wheedling, cajoling, concealing, and manipu-
lating is likely to be involved, meaning that a rational calculation 
of national interests will be rare indeed. While Myrdal does not 
explicitly embrace this interest aggregation model of the policy 
process, at least in the foreign policy sector, she comes fairly close 
to it in her discussion of strategic parity. As she points out, the 
limited stability of the nuclear stand-off does not require that the 
Soviet and American forces have roughly the same quantities in 
each of the major weapon categories. Rather, such stability (and 
she well recognizes how fragile it is) requires only that each have 
the capacity to: (a) ride out a first strike nuclear attack by the 
other; and (b) nevertheless be able to retaliate with sufficient 
force to produce damage levels that would be unacceptable to 
those contemplating the first strike. A central implication of this 
is that, in terms of strategic nuclear forces, preponderance is not 
only not necessary to the deterrent; rather it seriously vitiatesthe 
deterrent by appearing provocative, suggesting a possible first 
strike. Further, even strategic parity is not necessary, given: (a) 
the need for only a small remaining force to threaten unaccepta-
ble retaliatory damage; and (b) the virtual impossibility under 
current and projected technology of destroying most of the vic-
tim's retaliatory force via a first strike. What is needed, then, is 
a small but highly survivable second strike capability. 
Moreover, most strategic analysts in and around Washington 
and Moscow understand this technological virtue quite well. 
Why, then, do they call for or accept the drive for either superior-
ity or parity (and these preferences shift from time to time and 
bureau to bureau in both nations) when they appreciate that 
superiority could be destabilizing and that a marked quantitive 
inferiority would suffice? Partly, of course, the preoccupation 
with superiority reflects certain deviations from a straight nuclear 
deterrence doctrine. Some strategists want to acquire more than 
a deter-the-war capability, and actively seek a win-the-war arse-
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nal. Others pursue a so-called damage-limiting capability, so that 
a "retaliatory" blow could be launched on the basis of a warning 
alone, thus destroying-some or much of the enemy's forces before 
they were launched on their first strike mission. Still others see 
a nuclear-missile preponderance as a political and diplomatic 
instrument by which to intimidate the adversary in times of crisis 
or of intermittent war; one needs s-qperiority to prevail, and-at 
the minimum-parity to avoid being intimidated. 
While all of these considerations have a modicum of merit to 
them, it is improbable that a rational, competent, and patriotic 
official would find any or all of them sufficient to justify the 
pursuit of strategic superiority. The direct and indirect economic 
costs are staggering, the diplomatic efficacy is dubious, and the 
strategic consequence is too provocative; further, it drives the 
adversary to follow suit, with each side less secure than before. 
What, then, is the explanation? Again, Myrdal does not put it 
quite this way, but she would probably agree that the key factor 
is that mentioned above: the need for any political elite to put 
together a dominant coalition, without which it is impossible to 
govern in either the domestic or foreign sectors. Since the anti-
military factions in the superpowers have slowly dwindled in 
number and strength vis-a-vis those diverse groupings that see 
themselves (or their nation) as generally benefiting in the short 
run from continued or increased military expenditures, the politi-
cal predisposition is there. Then there are the psychic fears: (a) 
the nationalistic fear of the enemies of the moment; and (b) the 
personalistic fear of scoring low in political virility. 
When these sets of factors all combine with the sad fact that 
neither scholars nor practitioners know very much about interna-
tional security problems, the role of rationality declines even fur-
ther. That is, the type of systematic, scientific research that 
might help us predict the likely consequences of this or that pol-
icy move is still considered unnecessary and/or impossible by the 
policy elites of most nations, and as a result, little of it gets done. 
Thus, decision makers as well as their critics have little to go on 
but the common sense and conventional wisdom of the time and 
place; and given how frequently this folklore changes and how 
frequently it has led to disaster, we might well be surprised that 
it commands widespread assent and support in politically rele-
vant circles. To the contrary, each grouping and faction can inter-
pret the line in the most convenient way and those who differ with 
it can usually bargain for some modification in a proposed policy. 
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Aphoristically, one might say that the less solid-the evidence in 
support of a given policy decision, the greater ,vill be the potency 
of extra-rational parochial considerations to corrupt rational 
problem-solving. 
A final aspect of this superpower symbiosis is that it occurs 
not only within, but between, the United States and USSR. As 
suggested above, a major consideration in the formulation of na-
tional security policy, along with estimates of the adversary's 
hostile intentions, are estimates of his current and projected ca-
pacity to carry out such intentions. Thus, increases in the number 
or quality of a given weapon system on one side serve as a justifi-
cation and stimulus for further preparedness on the other side. Be 
it tanks, aircraft, warheads, a new missile, the observed or hy-
pothesized or alleged advantage of the adversary-even the 
"mineshaft gap" as Representative Aspin calls the argument in 
favor of more fallout shelters-any such real or imagined inade-
quacy can often justify yet another addition to the nation's arse-
nal. To reiterate, governments normally maintain some level of 
preparedness, and it takes very little external stimulus to jack 
that level up a bit; and with each increase, if accompanied by the 
appropriate political, economic, and propaganda gestures, the 
adversary's political elites have additional incentive to jack their 
own levels up a bit. This is how arms races usually begin, and 
once underway, the forces in favor tend to get stronger at the 
expense of those who might resist the pressures for further escala-
tion. In sum, the combination of external threat, internal predis-
position, limited knowledge, and short-run perspectives all com-
bine to produce, all too frequently, the acquisition of military 
forces that are more injurious than helpful to the security of the 
nation. In the next section, let us examine some of Myrdal's ideas 
as to how we might break out of this historically recurrent and 
often destructive self-amplifying process. 
SOME POSSIBLE STRATEGIES 
If, as suggested in the previous section, it is a relatively sim-
ple matter for two nations with some incompatible security inter-
ests to get into i:i.nd then prolong a costly and dangerous arms 
race, is it just as easy to slow it down and get out of it? While 
Myrdal could hardly be accused of thinking the problem of extri-
cation a simple one, she is at least willing to go the extra mile and 
take some important risks in the enterprise. Perhaps the biggest 
risk for those of us involved in the international security field is 
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a psychological and professional one: the risk of appearing "soft" 
on the putative enemy; or of appearing "naive" enough to believe 
that analyses must be ·offered and solutions considered and prof-
fered in a problem area that has suffered from an abundance of 
"hardness" and "realism." 
One of the most common weaknesses amongst practitioners 
and analysts on all sides (and especially manifest in the Western 
reviews of The Game of Disarmament) is the reluctance to go that 
extra mile. All too many of us have been willing for all too long 
to come up with a solution that seems fair and reasonable to 
ourselves, and merely hope that the other side will find it accept-
able. When they do not (almost always), we shrug our shoulders 
in a mix of resignation and self-righteousness, and announce that 
it is now up to them. The trouble is that "it" is the slim chance 
for creating a habitable world community, but from the post-war 
Acheson-Lilienthal proposals to the Soviet insistence on arms 
reduction prior to inspection, neither set of elites has shown the 
courage and creativity and determination that the dilemma de-
mands. 
Leaving history aside for the moment, what are the suggested 
directions found in Myrdal's agenda for disarmament? In this 
part of her book, she addresses the following problems: (a) the 
rising production and dissemination of conventional weapons; (b) 
the continued testing of nuclear weapons; (c) the continuing pro-
duction and rising proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) the con-
tinuing production of chemical and biological weapons. At the 
risk of oversimplifying, let me outline her approach to them. 
Recognizing that all arms reduction decisions of a govern-
ment will be affected by its strategic doctrine, she begins with the 
proposal that the nuclear powers first negotiate the basic size and 
type of their minimum strategic deterrent. That is, they would 
retain a nuclear weapons inventory until well into the conven-
tional and exotic weapons disarmament stage, but at a level that 
could hardly serve for any purpose other than a retaliatory strike 
against industrial and population centers. She urges that the 
quantity and development pattern of each component of this 
minimal deterrent be negotiated-on the basis of careful statisti-
cal analyses, simulation studies, etc.-as soon as possible. Once 
the "nuclear shield" levels had been settled, "the methods and 
the pace" of arriving at the agreed configurations at the agreed 
date could be worked out. 
Among the critical components of the nuclear-arms reduc-
tion process would be: (a) no more field tests of warheads; (b) no 
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more field tests of delivery vehicles; (c) as severe a restriction on 
research and development as could be negotiated and enforced; 
(d) the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones; and (e) a 
ban on the export of the weapons or their components. This re-
viewer fully agrees not only with Myrdal's emphasis on the need 
for all nuclear powers to accept and move quickly toward a bare-
boned minimum deterrent, but also with the general lines of her 
approach to that objective. Moreover, once we have lived with 
these low-level second-strike forces only, along with the institu-
tional mechanisms that would necessarily accompany this 
phased reduction and production cut-off period, we might have 
a chance to move on to a more secure, but more ambitious, ar-
rangement, in which all nuclear weapons have been gradually 
transferred to United Nations depots where they would be: (a) 
under close guard; (b) retrievable QY governments, in extremis; 
and (c) gradually deteriorating into low reliability. 
Space limitations preclude a more detailed treatment of 
these complex problems and the various options-often inconsis-
tent, but always suggestive-laid out by Myrdal, but a brief word 
as to exotic weapons and conventional weapons is needed here. 
She reminds us that international legal conventions outlaw some 
of the more inhumane devices of destruction such as napalm, 
dum-dum bullets, and bacteriological, chemical, and radiological 
weapons, not to mention aerial bombing of "civilian" popula-
tions, but that their development, testing, deployment, and use 
has not been appreciably inhibited by legal obligations. Amongst 
these proposed solutions are more explicit and universal agree-
ments to outlaw the use of these weapons in wartime, and to ban 
their testing, production, transportation, transfer, and deploy-
ment at all times. While there have been small steps in these 
directions, and some of the exotic weapons deteriorate rather rap-
idly, the net picture is far from promising. In addition, the devel-
opment of binary weapons, whose individual components may be 
nontoxic until they are brought together on launching or prior to 
impact, will make production more tempting and inspection 
more difficult. But given the low probability of maintaining their 
monopoly, the serious problems of field use, and the complexities 
of defending against them, a strong case can be made for major 
power initiatives to cease further production and to destroy exist-
ing inventories. This would, I should hope, extend to the 
enhanced-radiation weapon (neutron bomb) now being devel-
oped. 
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Turning to conventional weapons, the problems and dangers 
are more familiar, but the obstacles considerably greater. For 
virtually every national government in the world, there are sev-
eral major incentives to acquire and maintain relatively high lev-
els of conventional preparedness. Deterrence and defense may 
often be paramount, but such other considerations as regime se-
curity and internal control, domestic coalition building, manipu-
lation of the economy, political mobilization, and technological 
development, along with diplomatic leverage, all provide addi-
tional pressure for conventional weapons production or purchase. 
And, as with nuclear and exotic weapon systems, the observed, 
predicted, or rumored levels of the adversary's preparedness are 
by no means negligible. 
After reminding us that very little international negotiating 
attention has gone to conventional arms reduction, Myrdal out-
lines a number of possible initiatives that the major powers-as 
the leading producers as well as exporters-might undertake. The 
first is full disclosure of all military expenditures by all nations, 
and as the records become niore open, more standardized, and 
more reliable, the feasibility of agreed percentage cuts across the 
board might increase appreciably. Closely associated with disclo-
sure of production would be disclosure of arms exports and im-
ports. Central to this is her reminder that many of the exported 
weapons (napalm, fragmentation bombs, etc.) are already 
banned by international law and that the list should be expanded 
and its applicability reestablished. · 
Perhaps most critical, especially in the industrial nations 
that account for most of the world's production and export, is the 
role of economic conversion. Despite the fact that very little is 
known regarding both the effects of military spending and the 
likely effects of various rates of cutback in different sectors of 
diverse types of economy, there seems to be a growing consensus 
that: (a) sustained military expenditures inhibit economic growth 
and exercise an inflationary effect; and (b) the economic and 
social costs of conversion to nonmilitary production need not be 
high at all. But both sets of propositions require considerably 
more research, and conversion without some degree of planning 
could lead to serious unemployment and underutilization of 
plant and capital. Without the hard evidence that such research 
seems likely to generate, it will remain an easy matter for organ-
ized labor to coalesce with other interest groups in the industrial 
nations and help maintain or even expand the relative size of the 
military sector. I say this even though the work of SIPRI (the 
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which Myrdal 
largely inspired) has already led to a marked advance in our 
knowledge of the arms-economy relationship. 
In this connection, one of the more pervasive myths of 
today's world needs to be reexamined. That is, political elites 
often state that arms transfers give their nations greater influence 
on the domestic and foreign policies of the recipients, while deny-
ing or reducing the influence of their adversaries. I am not at all 
sure that this is true, even in the relatively short run, and, in the 
long run, it may even be a counterproductive instrument of for-
eign policy. illustrative might be the decline of Soviet influence 
in Egypt and China, and that of the Americans in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Further, as these words are being written, we hear that 
Iran will cancel a seven-billion dollar arms import contract with 
the United States, suggesting not only the impermanence of such 
influence, but the negative consequences of its decline, politically 
and economically; the Bakhtiar government's announcement 
produced a sharp drop in the dollar's value on world money mar-
kets and a dramatic upsurge in the price of gold. 
As an aside, one notes that the same governments that ex-
pend great energy and ingenuity to eliminate the drug trade will 
expend equal effort to expand their arms trade. To carry the 
analogy a step further, it is ironic that we relentlessly pursue the 
pusher who feeds his victim's drug addiction, but reward and 
encourage the pusher who feeds his victim's arms addiction. Per-
haps the events in Iran, and those that are all too likely in Saudi 
Arabia, will help other developing nations to kick this arms im-
port habit in time. 
CONCLUSION 
That I found Myrdal's book a gold mine of ideas, facts, and 
interpretations is evident from the nature of this essay. What 
began as a simple review turned into a lengthy discussion, stimu-
lated by her lively imagination, broad knowledge, and vigorous 
style! Perhaps even more stimulating is the mix of courage and 
commitment that pervades this valuable study. Having worked 
in the vineyards of armament and disarmament for even more 
years than the author, and taken a good deal of verbal criticism 
for views similar to hers, it is comforting and encouraging to find 
the occasional kindred spirit. Thus, while I would quarrel with 
some of Myrdal's views, lament the occasional errors and incon-
sistencies, regret the absence of a more fully developed and inte-
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grated political blueprint, and deplore the absence of a more 
tightly argued social science analysis, I can only applaud the 
appearance of this volume. 
The post-World War II literature on international security 
policy has, from most sectors of most nations, been scandalously 
inadequate. The bulk of it has been not only unimaginative in 
concept and prescientific in method, but parochial in its diag-
noses and timid in its prescriptions, overly "realistic" and pain-
fully nationalistic. Another portion of this literature, coming 
largely from Western and Japanese scholars, has been shrill and 
naive, reflecting all too often that disdain for the hard facts of 
military affairs found in the Marxian or the pacifist efforts. A 
third and smaller sector has been quite technical, focussing either 
on the legal or the technological side of things, but tending to 
ignore the political and ethical dimensions. Finally, a very small, 
but growing body of work is scientific in the sense of seeking to 
identify historical regularities or put certain theoretical models to 
the empirical test. These studies have usually focussed on the 
dynamics of arms races, the military budget process, or the corre-
lates of war, but not enough has been done so far to make their 
findings useful to the elites, or perhaps more importantly, the 
counter-elites. Against this rather disappointing record, Myrdal's 
book stands out as a major contribution. If humanity is fortunate, 
other specialists will pick up where this intrepid analyst leaves 
off, and in the meanwhile, governments and their critics will 
ponder and then act upon the basic themes that are so forcefully 
laid out in The Game of Disarmament. 
